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CHAPTER 16
National Narratives and the Invention 
of Ethnic Identities: Revisiting Cultural 
Memory and the Decolonized State 
in Morocco
Norah Karrouche
Educational systems are key to our understanding of the ways in which national 
identities are created, sustained and reproduced. When the project of nation 
building is closely associated or appears simultaneously with processes of mod-
ernization, state institutions play a crucial role in spreading national ideolo-
gies and creating shared cultures (Gellner, 2006). In the nineteenth century, 
European countries used divide-and-conquer politics overseas in order to sus-
tain their colonizing power. In this chapter, I scrutinize the lasting effects of 
such policies on the organization of ethnic and cultural differences within the 
so-called decolonized nation-state. I will primarily approach the issue by look-
ing into the ‘cultivation of culture’ (Leersen, 2006) that accompanies projects 
of nation building.
As Anderson (1991) argued, several modern institutions preoccupied with 
the classification of individuals and groups (such as the museum, the demo-
graphic census and the geographical map) were invented at a time when 
European expansionism was at its height. These modern institutions appeared 
simultaneously with the building of nation-states in Europe (Megill, 2011). 
Modern academic disciplines such as geography, historiography and especially 
ethnography developed during the nineteenth century as well as part of the 
colonial and imperial project (Stoler & Cooper, 1997). European nation-states 
introduced the system of standardized education in their colonies as a way 
to supersede local and regional loyalties. Education supported and sustained 
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moral citizenship and loyalty on a larger scale: that of the nation (Anderson, 
1991; Gellner, 2006). History education in particular caters to this need and 
provides historical depth and understanding to national subjects’ loyalty to the 
state, as it defines who counts as a citizen of the state and what it means to 
belong to a nation.
This chapter explores the ways in which the national narratives of supposedly 
decolonized societies are constructed. It focuses on North African countries 
that have previously been colonized by France and deals with the production 
of national narratives in the context of historiography and history education.
Recent developments in the Maghreb known to us as the ‘Arab Spring’ have 
put the construction of new national narratives high on the region’s political 
agenda. Over the past few decades, policymakers and socio-cultural activists 
have been preoccupied with national identity (Muslim, Arab and Berber) and 
ties with France. To what extent are those ‘new’ national narratives in Morocco 
truly ‘decolonized’?
I will henceforth focus on the persistence of the so-called ‘Berber issue’ in 
national historical culture, historiography and history education in particular. 
The French are known to have made an artificial distinction between Arabs 
and Berbers during colonial times, evaluating the Berbers on more positive 
terms. After independence in 1956, when Morocco was defined as an Arab 
and Muslim country, the Berbers—their language, culture and heritage—were 
marginalized. This narrative has been contested in recent years. Throughout 
the twentieth century, Berber identity has been subject to an intricate power 
dynamic which, until this day, impinges upon modes of meaning making in 
national historical culture. Actors in this process tend to claim a fixed location 
for the Berbers and the Arabs in Moroccan history. Berber culture is presented 
as static, fixed and unified and thus is set off against Arab and Islamic culture. 
The history of the Moroccan nation-state was reduced to the history of the 
monarchy. Most historiographers focused on writing a history of the nation 
that amounted to a history of the anti-colonial nationalist movement (Gilson 
Miller, 2014).
This chapter in particular explores the tension between regional and local 
Berber identities on the one hand and the Arab and Islamic identity of the 
Moroccan nation-state on the other. It does so by focusing on the historical 
narrative that has been taught in Moroccan schools from independence in 
1956 onwards. Recently, this narrative has been adapted to fit a new mul-
ticulturalist ideology. From the early 2000s onwards, ethnic and religious 
minorities have increasingly been included in national historical culture. 
More than half a century after independence from its former colonizers, 
states such as Morocco and Algeria continue to grapple with their respective 
legacies of colonization, especially within the fields of national historiogra-
phy and history education. In this chapter, I therefore scrutinize the histori-
cal process of decolonization and the re-invention of ethnic identities in the 
Maghreb.
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InventIng ethnIc IdentItIes In the colonIal Maghreb
The colonizing regimes of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have often 
all too quickly been represented as monolithic blocs of power that envisioned 
all colonized subjects as inferiors. This thesis has been countered many times 
over, resulting in the ruling academic opinion that colonizer-colonized rela-
tions were not always straightforward. Moreover, it has been suggested that 
colonizing regimes played out internal cultural differences in order to cate-
gorize their subjects and organize daily life in the colony (Stoler & Cooper, 
1997). The way in which colonial administrators and scholars thought about 
culture and ‘race’ were, however, far more ambiguous and ambivalent (Young, 
1995). For instance, in French colonial discourse on Morocco and Algeria, 
‘Arabs’ and ‘Berbers’ were at some point not merely seen as distinct cultural 
and ethnic ‘groups’. The difference was also objectified (Hammoudi, 1997; 
Laroui, 2011). French ethnologists and administrative staff re-interpreted 
existing social relations and political structures and henceforth obstructed a 
more lifelike representation of Moroccan society.
In the pre-colonial era, the transmission of baraka (religious blessing) from 
the sultan through religious brotherhoods and patron saints proved of particu-
lar importance in maintaining a balance of power. A division between secu-
lar and religious power probably had a hand in the way in which the French 
administrators conceived of local power. The sultan’s empire was thought of 
as precarious. Precisely because he was only widely recognized as a religious 
leader, the French were convinced his position had withheld Morocco from 
becoming a ‘true nation’ (Hammoudi, 1997).
The intertwinement of colonial policies and human sciences, and ethno-
graphic practice in particular, was thoroughly acknowledged by Talal Asad 
in Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter, published in Asad, 1973. In 
Orientalism (Said, 1978) and Orientalism Reconsidered (Said, 1985), Edward 
Said argued that the context within which our historical, ethnographic and 
geographical knowledge was produced was in fact a violent one. Said poi-
gnantly stressed the bond between representation on the one hand and knowl-
edge production on the other: the ties between Western ethnocentrism and a 
Western epistemic order (see discussion in Young, 2004: 165–168).
This evidently also holds true for French colonialism in Algeria, Morocco 
and Tunisia and the French doctrine of assimilation that came to dominate 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The French viewed their 
acquisitions abroad as full-fledged French regions and extensions of the French 
Republic. Assimilation of local populations was seen as the key to civilization. 
Inspired by these ideas of assimilation and regionalism, French intellectuals and 
policymakers envisioned North Africa as a region naturally belonging to France. 
The concept of assimilation entailed the belief that all humans were inherently 
equal and that this could be achieved through education. Hence, French eth-
nologists developed the so-called ‘Berber canon’ in which the Berbers were 
described as more civilized and secularized than the Arabs.
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Though often linked to French Enlightenment philosophy, the doctrine 
of assimilation was broadly held in the European continent from the mid- 
nineteenth century onwards. Together with the concept of regionalism, it 
underscored much of the political ideas during the French Third Republic: 
native elites could be, and were as a matter of fact, assimilated into colonial 
administrations (Betts, 2005). In both France and Spain, debates on how to 
administer colonial subjects and how to locate the colonies in homeland politics 
were tied to debates on national identity (Martin-Marquez, 2008; Silverstein, 
2002). When the French acquired Morocco, their ideologies had already been 
put to the test in Algeria, Africa and in overseas colonies.
A sociology or ‘vulgate’ (Burke, 2007) of Islam, Arabs and Berbers took 
shape in between the Napoleonic expedition to Egypt and the independence 
of Algeria in 1962. The ‘colonial archive’ on Moroccan populations was com-
piled between 1880 and 1930 and counts among the largest and most impres-
sive of all colonial archives. It was also greatly influenced by ethnographic 
knowledge produced earlier on in Algeria, where racism was rampant (Lorcin, 
1995). Whereas Algeria was home to a culturally diverse and linguistically plu-
ral society of Arabs, Berbers, Jews, a minority of blacks and Andalusians (the 
descendants from exiled Moors), the French narrowed these ‘groups’ down to 
just two: Algerian Arabs and Algerian Berbers. The binary and dichotomous 
imagery created was developed into a myth throughout the years of French 
domination of Algeria. Lorcin (1995) speaks of a myth not so much because 
the French differentiated between Arabs and Berbers as such but because the 
imagery gave way to a view that the Arabs were inferior to the Berbers and that 
the Berbers were superior to the Arabs. If the French wanted this imagery to 
be upheld through time, they needed geographical, historical and ethnological 
sources to document it.
MeMory and (de)colonIzatIon In the Maghreb
Political and military needs were answered with claims that Berbers inhab-
ited mountainous areas and Arabs the plains. Berbers were seen as sedentary 
peoples, Arabs as nomads. Religion was regarded an Arab prerogative, and the 
Berbers were pictured as only superficially islamicized but islamicized neverthe-
less. French missionaries were out to convert the Berbers to Christianity, much 
to the discontent of the colonial administration out of fear it would encourage 
Islamic sentiments overall. Islam remained an obstacle and problem the French 
never came to solve (Lorcin, 1995). As the colonial project progressed, the 
idea that ethnicity, culture and religiosity were tied to geographical areas within 
Algeria developed gradually. Within Maghrebi historiography, these ideas are 
known as the Kabyle (Algeria) or Berber ‘myth’ (for the Maghreb as a whole).
Notwithstanding the specificity of the Algerian case, Algeria henceforth 
became a point of reference for both Morocco and Tunisia. In the latter, the 
stereotypes existed but were never converted into policy (Lorcin, 1995). In 
Algeria, policies and legislation would never come to be based on the myth 
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and upon a separation between Arabs and Berbers, discrediting the former 
and favoring the latter. However, in Morocco, it did. There, the ethnic divide 
between Berbers and Arabs existed not only as a discourse but also as a prac-
tice. As France’s military control over le Maroc utile grew, geographical maps 
took stock of the diverse tribal groups. The latter were, in turn, well docu-
mented by so-called cartes and fiches de tribus that were researched and written 
by members of an academic committee (Burke, 2007). Such commissions and 
ethnographers’ reports were particularly constitutive of the colonies’ epistemic 
productions and power structures (Stoler, 2009).
This new politics was meant to prevent a repeat of the mistakes made in 
Algeria where the favoring of Arabic language and Islamic law had resulted 
in unexpected anti-French nationalist sentiments. The French feared similar 
developments in Morocco. A rising Moroccan nationalist opposition, unifying 
‘Arabs’ and ‘Berbers’, would obstruct France’s attempts to gain control over 
Morocco by divide-and-rule tactics. Islam and Arab culture were limited to the 
makhzen, where the central state power was located. Berbers were viewed as 
the original inhabitants of North Africa, with ‘probable’ European origins and 
preserved customs, rituals and superstitions of previous faiths, most notably 
paganism and Christianity. Their natural distrust of personified power reflected 
their democratic spirit. In addition, they were said to be monogamous and to 
treat their women in a more ‘European’ way than Arabs.
Moreover, the Berbers were thought to be particularly attached to their 
own customary laws and use of tribal councils, set on preserving their own lan-
guage, customs and ‘traditions’. Arabs and Berbers were thus seen as bounded 
groups, as incompatible units with clear and strict, even ‘natural’ boundaries. 
The French had become ignorant of the diversity of cultures and languages that 
had marked North African history. As such, ethnography and historiography 
came to evolve around dichotomous axes, around which there was only room 
for Berber and Arab culture. This lasted well into the following decades after 
independence in 1956. One might argue that French colonial history contin-
ues to underscore Moroccan and Algerian national historical culture and their 
respective conceptions of ethnic, cultural and religious identities in particular.
In the long run, the dichotomy created by the French impacted the Berber 
speaking populations more than the Arab speaking populations (Gross & 
McMurray, 1993). In the independent Moroccan state, support for the Berber 
case was seen as support for policies having originated during the French colo-
nial regime. Any sign of so-called Berberism was viewed as a ‘relic of the colo-
nial past’ (Maddy-Weitzman, 2007: 30). The ruling nationalist Istiqlal party 
sought to incorporate the Berbers into one larger Moroccan national identity 
solely based on Arabism and Islam. Moroccans involved in the urban nation-
alist movement operated in secret societies. They had been acquainted and 
 familiarized with both European and Arab ideas of nationalism, particularly 
those that had taken shape in Egypt, Palestine, Syria and other Maghrebi coun-
tries through several kinds of media, theater and travels. Sometimes, these elite 
had even been educated in Egypt. Their ideology was predominantly rooted 
NATIONAL NARRATIVES AND THE INVENTION OF ETHNIC IDENTITIES: REVISITING... 299
in anti-colonial struggles and nationalist currents (Burke, 1972; Segalla, 2009; 
Wyrtzen, 2011). The concept of ‘Moroccanism’ solved the Berber-Arab issue. 
Immediately after independence, fundamental decisions were made and edu-
cation especially proved a site where national identity was to be reimagined 
(Maddy-Weitzman, 2011; Segalla, 2009).
The Berbers henceforth obtained an ambiguous position in the Moroccan 
national narrative inspired by Arabism and Islam, both temporally and spatially. 
During the process of decolonization, the ‘Berber’ remained a signifier of ‘oth-
erness’. Regarded neither fully as insiders nor as outsiders, the Berbers were 
represented as the Arabs’ distant cousins, thus equally of Arab origin, albeit in 
a more primitive and indigenous state. The Berbers were to remain ‘other’ but 
were also assimilated into the historical destiny of the Arab and Islamic nation 
(McDougall, 2003, 2006). In 1961, Morocco was officially defined as an 
Arab and Islamic nation-state and constitutional monarchy. Three years prior, 
Morocco had become a member of the Arab League. The League co-financed 
a Rabat-based institution that set out to promote Arabization in the educa-
tional system in Morocco (Grandguillaume, 1983; Maddy-Weitzman, 2011).
The dichotomy between Arabs and Berbers was henceforth not erased 
but rather re-thought and re-worked. In what follows, I will thus look at the 
Berber myth as a form of cultural memory (Erll, 2008) and more particularly, 
as a schematic narrative template (Wertsch, 2008a) that reflects a specific, cul-
tural type of producing identities in the contemporary Maghreb that draws 
on a binary category that was invented during colonial times and continues to 
underscore identity-making. Wertsch (2008a: 123) views schematic narrative 
templates as productions of ‘(…) replicas that vary in their details but reflect a 
single general story line. In contrast to specific narratives, these templates do not 
deal with just one concrete episode from the past.’ In such contexts where ideol-
ogy is dominantly felt, identities are fragile and memories are easily manipu-
lated. In Moroccan history education, the ideology of the state prevails. It is a 
form of political memory that serves a political order, that is, that of the Arab 
and Islamic nation-state.
ModernIzatIon and hIstory educatIon In the Maghreb
The static, fixed and exclusionary interpretation of national identity and the 
(political) uses of history in national identity construction have been evalu-
ated negatively several times over (Grever, Haydn, & Ribbens, 2008; Grever, 
Pelzer, & Haydn, 2011; Ribbens, 2007). History may be readily used as a 
means to make claims in the struggles over national history and identity. 
Debates on the content of school curricula thus a priori exclude the possibil-
ity of this fixedness and stability of the interpretation of history that tends 
to prevail in nationalist discourses. Static and fixed conceptions of national 
identity can only lead to static and fixed interpretations of the past. How does 
this work in the context of formerly colonized states? States produce narratives 
and citizens equally consume them by reproducing and/or contesting them 
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(Wertsch, 2002). Edward Said (2000: 179) argued that invented traditions 
(Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983) used by states are: ‘(…) an instrument of rule 
in mass societies when the bonds of small social units like village and family were 
dissolving and authorities needed to find other ways of connecting a large number 
of people to each other.’
Ernest Gellner (2006) in particular has stressed that education was cru-
cial for nationalism to succeed as an ideology and in creating and maintaining 
moral membership of and loyalty to the nation. State institutions play a crucial 
role in the spread of national ideologies and the creation of a shared culture. 
In this view, modern state surveillance mechanisms imbue citizens with the 
importance of the nation-state and its ideology in their daily lives. In Morocco, 
this entailed downplaying cultural differences between Arabs and Berbers and 
stressing citizens’ shared identity as Moroccans and Muslims. The nation is 
narrated as a particular and homogenous culture with a particular history and 
destiny (Breuilly, 2006). Education is a site where narratives of the nation 
are produced: ‘(…) all breathe and speak and produce (…) the same culture’ 
(Gellner, 2006: 3–37). Unlike other forms of memory (i.e. social, cultural), 
political memory is always learned (Assmann, 2006) and has a more prescrip-
tive and compelling nature precisely because it enhances the shaping of political 
identities and not mere cultural or social ones (Assmann, 2011).
During the immediate post-independence years, education in Morocco was 
significantly and thoroughly reassessed and crafted to produce a Moroccan 
national identity. France had left Morocco with not just two, but three differ-
ent school types: French secular primary and secondary schools, primary and 
professional ‘Moroccan’ schools instated by the French for the locals, and tra-
ditional Islamic schools. In 1956 and 1957, Moroccan policy makers agreed to 
Arabize and ‘Moroccanize’ education. The nationalist party Istiqlal had driven 
these debates. They claimed a privileged position in these debates because they 
had played a pivotal role in the anti-colonial movement. ‘Moroccanization’ was 
viewed as a more hands-on solution to the Berber issue.
From 1956 until 1973, schools continued their use of French and Arabic 
manuals and textbooks. The former arose out of the French secular schools, 
the latter out of the Arab schools. From 1973 onwards, each subject was to 
be taught with the help of one manual and one teacher’s guide, produced by 
the Ministry of Education. After ‘Moroccanizing’ schools and teaching staff, a 
process of Arabization kicked in. In 1989, the use of Arabic in public education 
was strengthened. Since 1999, any Moroccan publishing company may submit 
proposals for manuals, but a committee overseen by the Ministry of Education 
ratifies and approves them. This measure was meant to introduce plurality in 
teaching methods but not so much in subject contents. Thus, the basic prin-
ciple of unification in education has not yet been abandoned. With this specific 
reform, the Ministry of Education adjusted outdated pedagogies. For instance, 
instead of relying all too heavily on narrative history, textbooks made more use 
of visualization and inserted edited historical and archival records, probing for 
more reasoning in classrooms and ‘diminishing’ nationalist ideology.
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From the early seventies onwards, the school became a place where 
Moroccan identity was to be shaped. Through education, all citizens—whether 
they belong to the elite classes or not—are reached (Balibar, 1991). Schools are 
therefore powerful sites where identities and linguistic communities are shaped. 
Within the bounds of educational settings, citizens thus learn the myths of the 
nation. History education in particular promotes views on who belongs to the 
nation and who does not. Wertsch (2002) especially has argued that nation- 
states and governments make use of narrative form in order to produce such a 
coherent story. For Wertsch, narrative form is the instrument through which 
memory is distributed. Memory cannot survive without a medium, and states 
turn to texts when they need to control and direct collective memories. History 
textbooks reflect the views of the state, not necessarily those of the citizens of 
the state. The content of history textbooks, the rules of production and their 
distribution reveal state views on history and state ideology. They are produced 
and distributed under national constraints (De Baets, 2002). Textbooks used 
in Moroccan schools were, for example, initially produced in Egypt because 
Morocco had become a member of the Arab League. The Egyptian Ministry 
of Education thus initially produced textbooks used in the Maghreb. This only 
changed in the early seventies. From then onwards, textbooks were produced 
in the capital, Rabat.
In general, national history textbooks in Morocco and Algeria have paid 
little attention to the Berbers. The politics of historical priority (Zerubavel, 
2003), wherein individuals and groups may want to claim a deeper history, a 
homeland or an ‘ancient’ lineage says a lot about how they (want to) position 
themselves in the present, how they construct and present their ‘identity’. It 
creates not only a sense of belonging and one’s place in the world but it also 
produces a particular claim to autochthony and indigenousness, that is, the 
roots of national identity. In Morocco, this consisted of countering the nar-
rative on the Berber identity of the Maghreb on the one hand and dismissing 
the ‘primitive’ status the Arabs and Muslims were accorded during colonial 
times on the other. One might argue that after independence, local discourse 
on Moroccan identity was colonized once again by an Arabism that ignored 
Morocco’s regional and local specificity.
arabs and berbers In hIstory textbooks
Over the course of four decades, the content of Moroccan history textbooks 
has barely changed, leaving room for only minor adaptations and adjustments 
to the textbooks’ contents, such as errata. The basic narrative template within 
each textbook has thus remained unaltered. The narrative in national history 
textbooks located the Berbers’ origins in the Middle East and hence accorded 
Arab origins to the Berbers, albeit in a more primitive state. The Berber did 
not disappear after the end of colonization; it rather remained a signifier in the 
state’s nationalism-in-reverse (Silverstein, 2002). Historical narratives were 
adjusted to meet the needs of national unity and identity. After independence, 
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historians could not erase the Berbers. The French view on Arab-Berber rela-
tions had been propagated in schools and among the urban and rural elites. 
It was a matter of incorporating and interpreting the presence of the Berbers 
in such a way that a Berber past would not be problematic: the Berbers were 
to remain ‘other’ and non-Arab, but at the same time they had to be incor-
porated into an Islamic and Arab nation. The Berber had to be assimilated 
into the historical destiny of an Arab and Islamic nation (McDougall, 2003, 
2006).
Therefore, national historians underlined the Canaanite origins of the 
Berbers, providing them with a distinct genealogy that linked them to the 
Arabs as their distant ‘cousins’ (McDougall, 2003: 72). Ibn Khaldun had 
located the Berbers’ origins in Mesopotamia. Some French ethnologists, not 
all, had supported this thesis. Historians thus struck a balance between relat-
edness with Arabs on the one hand and indigenousness on the other, albeit in 
a very distant, obscure past. The first Berber is Arab-Islamic historiography’s 
true ‘noble savage’ (McDougall, 2003: 75). Maghrebi historiography thus 
inverted the French discourse on civilization and replaced ‘the French’ with 
‘Arabs’. There had been Arab-Berber unity all along. Islam was an important 
turning point in national history. Islam salvaged and perfected both ethnic 
groups.
A narrative of the ‘mixing’ of races lies at the basis of Moroccan national 
identity and civilization. In Algeria, colonial politics of assimilation had resulted 
in a reconceptualization of the West and the ‘Algerian’ national spirit was now 
thought of as fundamentally different from Europe. Uniting Berbers and Arabs 
under the umbrella of ‘Islam’ did, however, not mark the beginning of his-
tory; in Algeria, according to McDougall (2006), it rather signified its end. 
This set out the principles and terms under which one could interpret what 
would follow after the unification established by the coming of Islam. In fact, 
in Maghrebi national historiographies, there is little change after the establish-
ment and rooting of Islam: there are only outside threats, seen as violence 
against the nation and as ‘civilizational’ violence. Colonialism is regarded as 
such a form of violence. Islam acts as a binding factor of the new ‘mixed race’, 
from which it also gathers its strength as a nation.
According to this Arab-Islamic master narrative, indeed, history ends with 
the arrival of Islam. Therefore the Berbers are accorded a negligible role in his-
tory and are hence cast and caught in a time before Islam, before civilization 
and before history. Not surprisingly, it is this specific dimension of time in the 
narrative construction of Berber identity which has been most contested by 
political opposition in the Maghreb. National histories tend to stress the com-
mon origins of the members of the national community, imbuing history with 
uniqueness and community with destiny. This uniqueness might be obtained 
through stories stressing the nation’s ethnicity and religion. In so doing, 
national histories are always excluding others (Lorenz, 2010).
National identity is equally consistent in that it undergoes change (Lorenz, 
2011; see also Ricoeur, 1992). National narratives on the Berbers’ pres-
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ence were thus plotted as linear, progressive stories and secularized versions 
of historical destinies (Lorenz, 2011). As an ethnic minority in independent 
Morocco and Algeria, Berbers were simultaneously rendered as ‘other’ because 
they were different from the Arabs. At the same time, they were conveyed as 
being part of the Arab and Islamic nation, minimalizing their cultural differ-
ence. There had been no substantial historical break with the coming of the 
Arabs and Islam, as the Berbers had originated from the very same region. 
Islam was seen as a uniting factor in national histories. Moreover, the idea of 
progress of history is linked to the Islamic ‘awakening’ and integrity of the 
national territory.
In My lessons in history, a Moroccan history textbook that has been used 
from the early eighties onwards in primary education, the origins of the 
Berbers in Morocco is treated. The subject of history in primary schools was 
taught in Arabic, not French. In the third chapter, The ancient populations 
of Morocco and their contact with Mediterranean peoples, Moroccan children 
are introduced to the Phoenicians, Romans, Vandals and Byzantines. A fourth 
chapter discusses the advent of Islam in Morocco and the ‘Islamic opening’ in 
Al-Andalus. Afterwards, chapters are built around dynastic successions: the 
foundation of the Idrissid dynasty and the creation of the Moroccan nation- 
state by Idris II. Then, the relations between Morocco and Europe during the 
nineteenth century, the industrial revolution in Europe and colonial empires 
and ‘the Moroccan crisis’ during the First and Second World Wars, are treated 
thematically. Particular attention is paid to the exile of Mohammed V and 
Moroccan independence. The textbook’s last chapters discuss the kingship of 
Hassan II.
The third chapter thus summarizes the presence of ancient ‘peoples’ in the 
Maghreb and devotes equal attention to each population, forming an ‘eth-
nic map’ of Morocco. The narrative (compare McDougall, 2003) balances 
between primordiality and hybridity. The Maghreb is considered as a ‘mixed’ 
region, which is nevertheless comprised of an original substratum that can 
justify the nation’s Arab-Islamic identity: all of these ‘peoples’, including the 
Berbers, originated in the Middle East. Young Moroccan citizens were hence 
taught that the first peoples inhabiting Morocco originated from the Arab 
peninsula, from Yemen in particular, allegedly fleeing from the war with the 
Canaanites.
These distinct groups interacted with each other and thus created the 
Barbar, the Barbarians (compare Maddy-Weitzman, 2011). The Berbers called 
themselves Amazigh in their Berber language, meaning ‘free people’. The word 
‘Barbar’, the author of the textbook My lessons in history explains, was used 
by Romans to name these groups. According to the Arabs that would come 
to North Africa, he further explains, the name meant ‘sons of Barbar’. The 
Berbers were not treated as one group in the textbook but as several smaller 
groups. The author distinguished between sedentary and nomadic Berbers. 
The first practiced agriculture, the second did not and lived off their cattle. 
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Furthermore, the book asserts that the Berbers are to be divided in three dia-
lect groups: Tashelhyit-, Tamazight- and Tarifit-speaking Berbers. These dia-
lects are ‘unintelligible’, the book asserts, because they are based heavily on 
the sounds ‘b’ and ‘r’. All three dialect groups are perceived as ‘Barbar’. The 
Berbers are represented as ‘simple’ people who are very much dependent on 
their own ‘traditional’ techniques and lifestyles. Within these groups, there 
are tribes headed by a sjeikh who unites them in times of war. The textbook 
notes that the Berbers are ‘equally courageous and noble’ in times of war. 
It is stressed that they are ‘good people, just like the Arabs’. Their psychical 
appearance is depicted and detailed; the textbook then focuses on their pagan 
religion. Tapestry and tajines are considered ‘typical Berber handicrafts and 
products’.
The narrative on the Berbers’ origins is followed by the story that the 
Romans colonized Africa. However, they were unable to penetrate into the 
mountainous areas. The Romans had a racist attitude and they focused on 
the economic development of the Maghreb. Christian and Jewish beliefs were 
propagated among the local populations, but—so the book states—traditional 
beliefs survived. From then on, the book directs attention to the Arabs and no 
longer to ‘Berbers’ or ‘local populations’. When the book details the coming 
of the Vandals and the Byzantine Empire, we find a story about ‘the Kahina 
who goes by the name of Dahia’, a woman who was at war against the Arabs. The 
latter destroyed those who were against Islam, the Berbers. The Berbers, the 
book tells us, were the ones who had previously obstructed foreigners from 
colonizing ‘the ancient Berber lands’. Hassan murdered the Kahina in 82 hijra 
(year-numbering system of the Islamic calendar starting in 622 CE, according 
to which 82 hijra corresponds with 701 CE). After the defeat of the Kahina, 
the author stresses the Berbers’ initial resistance against converting to Islam. 
However, after they had converted, they propagated Islam with ferocity. This 
culminates in the historical justification and narrative on Al-Andalus and the 
armies led by Tarik Ibn Zyad. The textbook’s antagonists in this particular 
chapter are the Romans, Vandals and Byzantines but not the Berbers. We read 
how the Berbers were acknowledged for defending their territory and the safe-
guarding of its integrity against foreign invaders. While the difference between 
Berbers and Arabs is maintained, it is also toned down. They are united as 
Muslims.
According to James Wertsch (2002, 2008a, 2008b), narratives are the cul-
tural tools that we apply to remember. He argues that, in order to be able 
to remember, we must story the ‘memory matter’. Memory matters as such 
are not storied. This often happens dialogically. Such narrating relies on the 
application of templates and formats. In the case of the origins of the Berbers, 
stories were dialectically narrated through the categories of Arab Muslims and 
Berbers. In the official narrative, the coming of Islam and Arabs signals a moral 
evaluative point and the definition of what it meant to belong to the nation and 
to be a Moroccan citizen.
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actIvIsM and conteMporary challenges
Since the late nineties, Moroccan social movements have contested this view 
on Moroccan national identity and interpretation of history. Protest has mostly 
been organized by Berber cultural activists who aim to revive Berber identity 
and culture in Maghreb countries and the Maghrebi diaspora. Mohammed 
Chafik, a prominent historian within the Berber Movement and former direc-
tor of the Royal Institute for Amazigh (Berber) Culture, and other histori-
ans and activists along with him, have not ceased to emphasize the need for 
the ‘decolonization’ of Moroccan national history. The ‘other’ (e.g. Roman, 
French, Arab) had perpetually written their history. In his A Brief Survey of 
Thirty-Three Centuries of Amazigh History, published by the Royal Institute in 
2005 in a new edition, Chafik appealed to an international audience and claimed 
that the stakes of memory, in the identity formation of Morocco and among 
Moroccan communities abroad, were high. Chafik proposed a re-reading of 
North African history in which the Berbers were accorded agency. Denying 
the very authenticity of these countries would mean that North African nation- 
states were denying the existence of the majority of their citizens and those 
citizens living abroad.
In contemporary history and social sciences textbooks (Maddy-Weitzman, 
2011), the narrative on the Berbers’ origins has been changed. The Berbers are 
no longer referred to as Barbar but solely as Imazighen, as ‘free people’. A nar-
rative that grants them indigenousness replaces the story of the Arab origins of 
the Berbers. Consequently, the Berbers are granted historical priority over the 
Arabs in North Africa. The Maghreb is nowadays called bilad al-Amazigh—
the land of the Berber. Contrary to the representation of Berber societies in 
the history textbooks used before, the Berbers are accorded other values than 
those related to honor because they defended Morocco and North Africa in 
general against foreign ‘invaders’. The Berbers’ resistance against ‘colonizing’ 
others throughout the region’s history is underscored and at the same time 
completed with notions such as democracy and solidarity. These values are con-
veyed through certain heroes that have traditionally underscored the Berber 
cultural and social movement’s counter-narratives, for instance, Amazigh kings 
such as Masinissa, Jugurtha and Juba, military leader Takfarinas. These are 
all said to have acted against foreign Roman rule in order to preserve Berber 
culture and territorial integrity. Antiquity belongs to the Berbers. But once 
the arrival of Islam is noted, the Berbers were pushed out of view as histori-
cal agents in the narrative although the Berber origins of the Almoravid and 
Almohad dynasties are noted. From the Islamic ‘awakening’ onwards, religion 
unites and ethnicity is erased.
The narrative also selectively ‘forgets’ episodes of internal religious strife, 
as these could be interpreted as ethnic divisions within a religious community 
of Muslims. Whereas the Berbers are granted historical priority, with origins 
located inside the Maghreb and not on the Arab Peninsula, the binary cat-
egories of Arabs and Berbers have up to this day not been erased but rather 
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retained. By rewriting the narrative on the Berbers’ origins, by claiming his-
torical priority and indigenousness, Moroccan citizens remain dependent on 
the canon of French ethnologists, geographers and historians as it was crystal-
lized in the French mythe berbère. Hence, the ‘schematic narrative template’ 
(Wertsch, 2002) dialogically shapes the binary thinking in national narratives, 
the myths of the nation and the counter-memories of those who shape and 
contest them. Individuals and communities create a sense of belonging and 
construct their identity by imbuing the past with meaning in the act of nar-
rating about it. Despite globalization, processes of migration and the so-called 
waning relevance of nation-states and the de-territorialization of identities, the 
national—as a frame of remembrance and reference—remains an important 
marker of identity.
 conclusIon
States may turn to texts when they need to control and direct the collective 
memories of their subjects. As argued throughout this chapter, standardized 
education and history education in particular are often used as means to create 
and sustain national identities and produce a sense of belonging. Nation-states 
and governments make use of narrative form in order to produce a coher-
ent story (Wertsch, 2002). This chapter looked into the narrative templates 
that were produced during the process of decolonization and modernization 
in the Maghreb from 1956 onwards and the ways in which they relied on 
knowledge produced earlier on during the colonial era. It did so by looking 
at the re-invention of the ethnic and cultural differences between Arabs and 
Berbers and the production of a national historical narrative in the newly inde-
pendent, decolonizing Moroccan nation-state. After independence in 1956, 
the Moroccan nationalist movement and monarchy proposed and imposed a 
national identity that was both Arab and Muslim but failed to incorporate 
Berber identity because this aspect of Moroccan cultural and social relations 
had become too closely associated with the colonizer’s legacy, more specifically 
its policy of ‘divide and rule’. The colonizing states of the nineteenth cen-
tury are known to have stressed internal cultural and ethnic differences in the 
colonies in order to facilitate their political project. If not erased, differences 
between Arabs and Berbers were minimalized in order to unify the Moroccans 
after independence. The Arab-Berber distinction functions as a narrative tem-
plate that had once been imagined by the French and which was re-mediated 
after independence. Identity always needs an ‘other’ (Ricoeur, 1992). Perhaps 
cultural memory has not been fully decolonized in the Maghreb countries.
It becomes clear that what is needed in processes of decolonization and 
modernization in history education consists not so much of an authentic but 
rather a useable past. In decolonized states in general, categories of identity 
often relate back to past colonial politics of identity making. In this respect, 
research into the ways in which various forms of colonial rule continue to 
impact identity making in such decolonized states has become a pressing mat-
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ter. Throughout the past five decades, the national narrative of Morocco and 
the Berbers’ status in particular have undergone significant changes. Social and 
cultural activism, often supported by the diaspora, has pressured the Moroccan 
national government and royal house into democratizing state institutions such 
as education and into reconsidering its historical imagination as a nation-state, 
including the country’s Jewish and Berber heritage (Ben-Layashi & Maddy-
Weitzman, 2010). Yet as ‘an eternal other’, so tightly linked to the historical 
process of colonization and the anti- colonial Arab nationalist answer it brought 
forth, the cultural and ethnic identity of ‘the Berber’ remains in need of re-
invention. Perhaps the answer to the decolonization of national narratives in 
the postcolonial Maghreb lies not in its contents, but in its method. Most of 
all, the place of the Berbers in the national historical narratives in the Maghreb 
is in need of deconstruction.
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